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Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism proposes a naturalized account
of libertarian free will, one that attempts to fit ourselves as free agents
into the natural world characterized by science. As Kane describes it,
his theory is an attempt “to see how far one can go in making sense of
libertarian freedom without appealing either to sui generis kinds of agency
or causation” (2002, p. 416). If Kane were successful in providing an
intelligible account of libertarian freedom, one that avoided such extra
(or special> factors, such an account would need to be taken seriously
by naturalists like myself. But as Leigh Vicens (2015) describes in her
excellent paper, Kane’s account faces a number of devastating criticisms.
The two that Vicens focuses on has to do with (1) Kane’s notion of dual
efforts and (2) the intelligibility of talking about efforts to form particular
intentions.
The first criticism maintains that Kane’s notion of dual efforts—which
is an essential component of his overall account—makes Self-forming
actions (SFA) irrational since they involve an agent making efforts to do
two incompatible things simultaneously. This criticism is a good one in
my book. In fact, I developed a version of it myself in Free Will and
Consciousness (2012). There I presented the following example:
[H]ow are we to understand an agent that is actively and
simultaneously trying to bring about two inconsistent ends?
When an agent is confronted with a difficult moral choice—
like whether they should accept the sexual advances of a
stranger or stay faithful to their spouse—4t’s easy to imagine
the agent experiencing a conflict of desires. But to say that
in such a situation the agent is actively willing both the moral
choice to stay faithful to their wife and the choice to give in
to their temptation makes the agent appear irrational, Such
simultaneous but inconsistent efforts of will amount to the
agent willing P and Not-P at the same time. Not only is this of
dubious coherence, it is far from the model of rationally guided
behavior we were promised [by Kane]. (Furthermore, it’s
worth reiterating just how counter-intuitive this is as an account
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of “overcoming temptation” Try explaining to your wife that
you actively willed (hence fried) sleeping with a stranger but
was unsuccessful because the competing neural network “won”
out—the result of an indeterminate event!) (2012. p. 51)
Given these difficulties, I agree with Vicens that this is a serious objection
to Kane’s account.
Vicens’ second objection is that “it does not make sense to speak
of efforts to form particular intentions at all” (2015, p 93). Here too I
agree. On Kane’s account, the dual efforts involved in SFAs are efforts
to make a choice, which Kane defines as “the formation of an intention...
to do something” (2007, p. 33). I agree with Vicens when she questions,
“what exactly does it mean to make an effort to intend to do something?”
(2015, p. 96). This component of Kane’s theory leads to conceptual
confusion. As Vicens correctly notes, when we speak of an agent “making
an effort” what we typically have in mind is the agent making an effort to
do something intentional. “But if this is what ‘making an effort’ means,”
Vicens argues, “then to say that someone is making an effort to form a
particular intention would imply that she is intendIng to form a particular
intention, which would seem nonsensical” (2015, p. 96).
Given that I agree with both ofVicens’ criticisms of Kane, I will focus
the remainder of my comments on evaluating Vicens’ alternative account.
Vicens maintains that both of these objections can be avoided if we
instead place the indeterminism earlier in the sequence—that is, instead of
viewing conflicting desires as leading to competing efforts ofwill, which
is then only settled by an indeterminist event (i.e., one neural network
temporarily winning out over an other), Vicens suggests that we instead
conceive of the conflict between our desires as being resolved before they
lead to competing volitional efforts. In her own words:
The indeterminism in Kane’s model could still be preserved
by supposing that it is undetermined which of the conflicting
desires will “win’—or, to put the point in more agent-friendly
terms, which of two incommensurable reasons will be selected
by an agent as her motivation for acting, and so which of two
possible but incompatible intentions (to act in a particular
way for a particular reason) the agent will form. On such
an alternative model. when one reason is selected. the agent
thereby forms an intention to act in a particular way rather than
another. (2015. p. 95)
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Vicens maintains that this alternative model of SFAs preserves the core of
what Kane is after indeterminism, voluntariness, and rationality. While
I’m sympathetic to Vicens attempt to avoid Kane’s dual efforts, I’m not
entirely cons inced her alternati”e account is capable ofmaking intelligible
event-causal libertarianism.
Here are some of my worries. First, it’s not entirely clear to me that
Vicens’ account preserves one ofthe virtues ofKane’s account. On Kane’s
account, whatever the outcome turns out to be in the case of a SFA, the
agent can be said to have wanted and willed that action. Can we say the
same on Vicens’ account? It’s unclear to me that we can. If an agent
forms an intention to act in a particular way rather than another—that is,
they settle which of the conflicting desires they intend to act on before
they make an effort of will—how can we then say that they willed both
outcomes? Vicens has a couple of moves available to here. She could
argue that once the agent forms an intention to act, they could not have
willed otherwise since their intention determines the subsequent effort of
will, The problem with this response, however, is that is doesn’t allow
for the ability to do otherwise after the point at which the intention has
been settled on. It also doesn’t preserve the idea that the agent willed
both outcomes, hence deserves to be held morally responsible (in the basic
desert sense) for either outcome.
Of course Vicens could argue that willing both options is exactly
the problem with Kane’s account, and that all that is needed to preserve
reasons-backing-ness is that the agent desired both outcomes, had reasons
for acting on either, and that indeterminism existed at the point of intention
formation. But I’m not convinced that this is enough to preserve basic
desert moral responsibility. I have plenty of desires that I do not act on,
which do not reach the level of intention formation, and for which I think
it would be wrong to judge me praiseworthy or blameworthy. To say, then,
that the agent is morally responsible, whatever the outcome, would require
that both desires reach the level of intention formation since it is at this
level that we hold agents morally responsible.
Vicens could, I imagine, go counterfactual here. Suppose, to use
Kane’s example, a businesswoman on her way to an important meeting
witnesses an assault taking place, and is faced with the choice of stopping
to call for help, or continuing on her way. Vicens could argue that the
businesswoman wants to do both, but cannot; and what she will end up
forming an intention to do is undetermined. Suppose she ends up forming
an intention to call for help. On Vicens’ view, she won’t have made an
effort of will to form this intention but she presumably will subsequently
will to execute her intention, or carry out the course of action that she has
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decided to do, Vicens could therefore say that if she ends up stopping to
call for help. this is something she will have made an effort of will to do.
On the other hand, if she ends up forming an intention to continue on to
her meeting, then she will presumably will to execute this intention. So
if she ends up continuing on to her meeting, then this will be something
she will have made an effort of will to do. Thus on this possible reply,
the agent is not determined to do what she does, hut whatever she ends up
doing it can be said to be something she willed.
While a more promising response than the first option, 1 think it
effectively turns Vicens’ account into a covert compatibilism (of the
conditional analyses type) with an idle indeterminist premise dangling
subjoined! What seems to be doing the real work here is not the
indeterminism, but the counterfactual analysis of willing. What this reply
is really saying is that, f the businesswoman had decided to continue on
to her meeting (contrary to fact), then she would have been blameworthy
since she would have made an effort of will to do so. If this is what Vicens
has in mind, she needs to explain how this differs from a now widely
rejected version of old-school compatibilism.
Another option open to Vicens is to argue that even after the agent
has formed an intention to act in a particular way, it is still indeterminate
which effort of will and subsequent choice will be made. But how would
this reply respond to a case where an agent forms an intention to do X (say’,
to do the moral thing) but ends up doing Y (acting from ambition). In such
a case, it would be impossible to say that the agent willed and wanted to do
Y since the outcome runs contrary to his/her settled intention.
My second concern has to do with naturalism. Is Vicens smuggling
in “sui generis kinds of agency and causation,” something Kane works
hard to avoid (and for good reason)? When presenting her alternative
account, Vicens adopts the language of agent-causation. She says that
it’s the agent who selects her motivation for action—i.e., which of two
possible but incompatible intentions she will form. I find this language
confl.ising since the main appeal of Kane’s account (at least for many) is
that it avoids the scientifically dubious commitments of agent-causation.
If Vicens is appealing to sui generis kinds of agency and causation here,
then there are several additional objections she would need to address—
which she does not take up in her paper. I would therefore like Vicens to
clarify her metaphysical commitments further. Is her proposal a version of
event-causal libertarianism? Or is she introducing additional metaphysical
commitments?
Lastly, assuming for the moment that Vicens proposal is a version of
event-causal libertarianism, then I think it faces the same luck objection, or
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disappearing agent objection, typically raised against other event-causal
theories. As Derk Pereboom describes the disappearing agent objection:
Consider a decision that ocurs in a context in which the
agent s moral motivations favor that decision, and her
prudential motivations favor her refraining from making it.
and the strengths of these motivations are in equipoise. On an
event-causal libertarian picture, the relevant causal conditions
antecedent to the decision, i.e., the occurrence of certain agent-
involving events, do not settle whether the decision will occur.
but only render the occurrence of the decision about 50%
probable. In fact, because no occurrence of antecedent events
settles whether the decision will occur, and only antecedent
events are causally relevant, nothing settles whether the
decision will occur. Thus it can’t be that the agent or anything
about the agent settles whether the decision will occur, and she
therefore will lack the control required for basic desert moral
responsibility for it. (2014, p. 32)
The concern is that, because event-causal libertarian agents will not have
the power to settle whether the decision will occur, they cannot have the
role in action that basic desert moral responsibility demands. I don’t see
how Vicens account fairs any better here. Without bringing agent-causal
powers back into the picture, what does it means to say that the agent
“selects” one set of reasons (as her motivation for acting) over another?
Presumably this “selection” is not within the active control of the agent
since it is the result of an indeterminist “wining out” that the agent has
no ultimate control over. [Put in terms of my earlier example (where one
is torn between accepting the sexual advances of a stranger or staying
faithful to their spouse), I don’t see how we can accurately describe one
desire temporarily winning out because of an indeterminist event (say, the
desire to remain faithful) as an act of“overcoming temptation”—an act for
which the agent is morally praiseworthy!j
I conclude, then, that while Kane is not able to preserve free will.
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